State of Utah v. William D. Tyree : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. William D. Tyree : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Jeffrey W. Hall; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Tyree, No. 20000011 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2557
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM D. TYREE, : Case No. 20000011-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for absconding, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-3095 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. 
JOAN C. WATT (3967) 
JEFFREY W. HALL (7870) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
«jJL ,LED 
u»n Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 2 2000 
Pautette Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM D. TYREE, : Case No. 20000011 -CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for absconding, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-3095 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, 
presiding. 
JOAN C. WATT (3967) 
JEFFREY W. HALL (7870) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION TO 
SENTENCE APPELLANT WHEN IT CONTINUED THE 
TIME FOR IMPOSING SENTENCE BEYOND THE 45 DAY 
LIMIT WITHOUT TYREE'S CONCURRENCE. 2 
A. RULE 22(a) REQUIRES THAT SENTENCING 
OCCUR WITHIN 45 DAYS OF THE PLEA UNLESS 
THE DEFENDANT AGREES OTHERWISE 2 
B. TYREE DID NOT AGREE TO EXTEND THE 
MAXIMUM TIME FOR SENTENCING 5 
C. RULE 22(a) CREATES A JURISDICTIONAL BAR 6 
D. THE CLAIM OF PREJUDICE IS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT 6 
CONCLUSION 8 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Scott v. Majors. 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214 3 
State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 3 
State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977) 4 
State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 3 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (1999) 5 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) passim 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM D. TYREE, : Case No. 20000011 -CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plain language of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) requires that sentence actually be 
imposed within the statutory maximum of 45 days from the plea unless the defendant 
agrees otherwise. Moreover, even if the statute were ambiguous, the purpose of the 
statute, policy considerations and the amendment extending the period to allow 
preparation of presentence reports demonstrate that Rule 22(a) requires actual imposition 
of sentence within the statutory period unless the defendant agrees to be sentenced 
outside that period. 
Tyree did not agree to be sentenced outside the statutory maximum in this case. 
The language of the rule requires an affirmative concurrence in order to be sentenced 
beyond the statutory maximum. Requesting a presentence report at the plea hearing and 
remaining silent when the judge continues sentencing on his own motion does not amount 
to an affirmative concurrence. 
Tyree argued prejudice below, thereby preserving his prejudice argument for 
appeal. The record also supports the prejudice argument since defense counsel proffered 
the adverse effects caused by a delay in sentencing. Moreover, because the present case 
could not be reviewed by the Board of Pardons until Tyree was sentenced, the delay in 
sentencing in this case created an apparent adverse effect without requiring resort to 
further record support. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION TO SENTENCE 
APPELLANT WHEN IT CONTINUED THE TIME FOR IMPOSING 
SENTENCE BEYOND THE 45 DAY LIMIT WITHOUT TYREE'S 
CONCURRENCE. 
A. RULE 22(a) REQUIRES THAT SENTENCING OCCUR WITHIN 45 
DAYS OF THE PLEA UNLESS THE DEFENDANT AGREES 
OTHERWISE. 
The state argues that the plain language of Rule 22(a) requires only that the trial 
court initially schedule a time for imposing sentence which is within 45 days of the plea. 
State's brief ("S.B.") at 5-6. According to the state, once the trial judge has initially 
scheduled sentencing within 45 days, the requirements of the plain language of the rule 
are met, and any continuances outside the 45-day time period do not violate the rule. S.B. 
at 5. 
Contrary to the state's claim, Rule 22(a) requires that sentencing be imposed 
within 45 days of the plea unless the defendant agrees otherwise. The plain language of 
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the rule mandates that the trial judge "set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be 
less than two nor more than 45 days after verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders." This language requires not just that a 
time for sentencing be set within the period, but that the sentence be imposed within the 
applicable period. If the rule required only that the initial date for sentencing be within 
the 45 days, the term "imposing sentence" would be unnecessary. See State v. 
Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("When examining a statute's plain 
language, we strive . . . to give effect to all of the statute's terms."). Instead, the rule 
would state that the trial judge was required to schedule an initial sentencing time within 
that period. 
While the plain language of the rule appears to require sentencing within 45 days 
of the plea unless the defendant agrees otherwise, even if the language were ambiguous 
and could be interpreted as the state suggests, such an interpretation fails when the rule is 
read as a whole and its purpose is considered. See generally Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT 
App 139, %9, 980 P.2d 214 (courts resort to methods of interpretation other than reliance 
on plain language when the language of the statute is ambiguous); State v. Garcia, 965 
P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (in interpreting a statute, courts look first to plain 
language; where plain language is ambiguous, courts may consider legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations). 
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Even a cursory reading of Rule 22(a) shows that the purpose of the rule is to 
ensure that unreasonable delays in imposing sentence do not occur. No purpose would be 
served by requiring only that an initial sentencing date be set within the 45 days. Trial 
judges could actually sentence defendants whenever they pleased if the state were correct 
in its interpretation of the rule. Under such an interpretation, the rule would have no 
impact in precluding unreasonable delays in sentencing. Moreover, the state's 
interpretation would result in an inefficient administration of justice since defendants 
would be required to appear for sentencing within the 45 days., then appear later when the 
judge actually intended to impose sentence. The rule makes no sense unless it is read to 
require sentence be imposed within 45 days of the plea unless the defendant agrees 
otherwise. 
Case law interpreting the predecessor statute tells us that one of the purposes is to 
ensure that unreasonable delay in sentencing not occur. See State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 
797 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the rule was revised to extend the maximum time for 
sentencing to 45 days to allow time for preparation of presentence reports and to 
otherwise ensure that the rule continued to be effective in ensuring that persons are 
sentenced within a reasonable amount of time. Amending the rule to extend the time to 
allow for preparation of presentence reports would be unnecessary if the state were 
correct that the rule simply requires an initial setting, and not actual imposition of 
sentencing, within the applicable period. If the state were correct, the extension of the 
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maximum period to 45 days would have been unnecessary since any sentencing requiring 
a presentence report could simply be continued without the concurrence of the defendant. 
The state is incorrect when it claims that the rule does not require actual sentencing 
within the maximum period, and instead requires only that an initial date for sentencing 
be set within that period. The language of the rule, its purpose, policy considerations, 
and the amendment of the maximum time period all demonstrate that the rule requires 
actual sentencing within the applicable period, unless the defendant agrees otherwise. 
B. TYREE DID NOT AGREE TO EXTEND THE MAXIMUM TIME 
FOR SENTENCING. 
The state argues that Tyree agreed to the continuances of sentencing by not 
objecting when the trial judge continued sentencing in order to obtain a presentence 
report, and that the requirements of Rule 22(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) 
(1999) were therefore met. S.B. at 5-6. While the state is correct that in some 
circumstances, a defendant's silence can constitute a waiver, that is not the case with 
Rule 22(a). The language of Rule 22(a), which explicitly requires the concurrence of the 
defendant, implies that an affirmative act by the defendant is necessary in order to 
continue sentencing. In this case, Tyree did not affirmatively agree to the trial judge's 
decision to sentence him outside the maximum period. 
The fact that Tyree requested a presentence report when he entered his plea does 
not demonstrate that he agreed to the sentencing continuances which occurred later. At 
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the time Tyree requested the presentence report, the expectation was that Tyree would be 
sentenced within the statutory period. In fact, at the time he requested the presentence 
report, sentencing was scheduled during the applicable period. Because Tyree did not 
know that his request for a presentence report would result in a sentencing hearing far 
outside the statutory period, his request for a presentence report cannot reasonably be read 
as an agreement to be sentenced beyond the statutory maximum. The facts that Tyree 
requested a presentence report when he pled guilty and did not object to the continuance 
of the sentencing do not amount to an affirmative concurrence to be sentenced outside the 
maximum period. 
C. RULE 22(a) CREATES A JURISDICTIONAL BAR. 
Tyree's argument that Rule 22(a) creates a jurisdictional bar is adequately set forth 
in Appellant's opening brief at 6-11. Reply is unnecessary as to this aspect of Appellant's 
argument. 
D. THE CLAIM OF PREJUDICE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT. 
Although Tyree argues that Rule 22(a) creates a jurisdictional bar, he also argues 
that even if a jurisdictional bar did not exist, he was prejudiced by the delay in sentencing. 
Contrary to the state's claim that Appellant's prejudice argument was not made below 
(S.B. at 14-15), that argument is found at R. 65:16-17. 
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The prosecutor argued that Tyree could not "articulate that he's been prejudiced." 
R. 65:15. Defense counsel responded that Tyree had in fact been prejudiced by the delay 
in sentencing. 
Defense counsel: —I agree with the State, that Helms does anticipate a 
balancing test, a prong of which is prejudice to the Defendant. So we 
dispute that that is part of what this Court ought to engage with Rule 22(a). 
But just for the sake of argument, if the Court is looking for an adverse 
affect to the Defendant, the presence of an open case prohibits him from 
receiving privileges at the prison. It prohibits him from going before the 
Board. It— and so it does work an adverse affect. 
R. 65:16. 
This passage establishes that the state is incorrect when it claims that Tyree did not 
raise the prejudice argument below. Additionally, it shows that defense counsel proffered 
the adverse effects to Tyree when a case he was not sentenced in a timely fashion. Thus, 
the state's claim that the prejudice argument has no record support is also incorrect. 
Moreover, it is obvious that an inmate will not go before the Board on at least the case in 
which sentencing is delayed until after sentence is actually imposed. The very fact that 
Tyree had not been sentenced establishes, without need to resort to other support, that 
Tyree was not able to appear before the Board in this case until sentencing actually 
occurred. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant William Tyree respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence. 
SUBMITTED this J2^L day of September, 2000. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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